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When I was first approached some three weeks ago to deliv­
er this paper, I was, I must admit, a bit sceptical about the 
whole idea of participating in this conference. First of all as 
a judge I am naturally a bit wary of talking in public about 
matters which, directly or indirectly, fall within the compe­
tence of one or more of the courts to which I am ordinarily 
assigned by the Head of State. A judge - at least a judge of 
the 'English' or 'Scottish' mould to which Maltese judges 
have generally looked for inspiration and emulation as to eth­
ical behaviour - is trained to speak his mind on important 
issues only in the judgements he delivers, and then only to 
the extent that may be necessary for the determination of the 
issue or issues in the case and/or to the extent that the judge­
ment in question would benefit from the expression of such 
views. On the other hand, as a university lecturer, I am occa­
sionally asked some searching question by the unusually bright 
student which calls for more than just a statement of what the 
law is. In that case I usually very readily subscribe, at least tem­
porarily, to the 'continental' model of the judge- on the con­
tinent judges are less inhibited when it comes to expressing 
their views in public and out of court (and in some countries, 
teaching in universities is the only 'other activity' in which 
a judge may lawfully and ethically indulge). 
The second reason why I was sceptical is that so much 
has been said, and is still being said, about the 'drugs problem' 
in Malta that I was doubtful whether I could really contribute 
anything new to the discussion. Much has been said and writ­
ten over the last fifteen or twenty years in connection with 
this problem, and much has also been done, both by Govern­
ment agencies and voluntary agencies by way of attempting 
to find 'solutions'. On the other hand, and upon further reflec­
tion, I realized that much of what the general public knows 
about the criminal justice system in general, and with regard 
to the 'drugs problem' in particular, is, of course, mediated 
through newspapers and radio and television reports and pro­
grammes, and not as a result of first hand experience. This 
often leads to a distorted picture or, perhaps I should say, to 
'distorted pictures' (in the plural) of what goes on in court. 
Judgements, the conduct of the prosecution in a particular 
case, the conduct of defence counsel, the law itself- all these 
are criticized even though the person writing in the news­
paper or reporting on the radio or TV station in the majori­
ty of cases does not have all the facts of the case before him. 
He is usually more interested in the unusual, in the sensa­
tional: after all it is the unusual and the sensational that will 
attract the reader, the listener or the viewer, that will raise 
sales or viewership or listenership. Needless to say, it is very 
easy to criticize, especially when one does not have the re­
sponsibility of deciding on the fate of a fellow citizen while 
at the same time keeping in mind the legitimate interests of 
society as a whole; it is easy to criticize when one does not 
have the difficult task of marshalling the evidence for the 
prosecution, or when one does not have the often unenviable 
task of testing the prosecution evidence on behalf of the ac­
cused. I must admit that I know very few people who work 
in the media who subscribe to Matthew Arnold's definition 
of criticism: 'a disinterested endeavour to learn and propa­
gate the best that is known and thought in the world'. What 
is more, politicians periodically hijack the 'drugs problem'; 
each one of our two major political parties attempts to outdo 
and outshine the other as to what is being done to fight the 
scourge of our times; statistics are thrown about with gay 
abandon, unmindful of the statistician's first canon of faith, 
namely 'that there are three types of lies: lies, damned lies and 
statistics'. Of course, lip service is paid to the proposition that 
the 'drugs problem' should not be politicized, but make no 
mistake about it, the 'drugs problem' is a vote catcher or vote 
loser and a hot potato in political circles: suffice it to re­
member that in the recent past two ministers of justice have 
had their ministerial career upset because of what was re­
garded as 'politically inappropriate' behaviour in adminis­
tratively handling certain matters related to drug offenders. 
What I propose to do in the time allotted to me is to share 
with you some views on how the law relating to drug abuse 
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has evolved over the years in Malta, how it has attempted to 
deal with the upsurge in drug abuse since the early seven­
ties; and to identify some of the practical difficulties which 
judges and magistrates in the main, but also prosecutors and 
defence counsel, encounter in the application of the relevant 
laws. To some of you what I have to say may not be new, in 
which case I crave your indulgence and ask you to be pa­
tient for the next thirty minutes. I do not expect any of you 
to agree with opinions that I may express; and, indeed, after 
I deliver this paper I would be very pleased to have some 
reaction, especially by way of criticism, to some of the views 
I will be expressing. I will also be very happy to answer any 
question on matters which I will not be covering but which 
are related to the general title of this plenary. 
The first thing to bear in mind is that in reality there is not 
just 'one' law dealing with the fight against drug abuse. Al­
though undoubtedly the most commonly known - I hesitate 
to use the phrase 'the most popular' - is the Dangerous Drugs 
Ordinance, there are in reality a number of other laws which 
are applied, often contemporaneously, in connection with any 
one particular case: the Criminal Code, the Customs Ordi­
nance, the Medical and Kindred Professions Ordinance, the 
Probation of Offenders Act, The Prevention of Money Laun­
dering Act are perhaps the most important statutes that gen­
erally go, in various permutations or combinations, into the 
equation. Of course the laws which criminalize certain forms 
of drug possession, drug taking or drug trafficking are the 
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance and the Medical and Kindred 
Professions Ordinance (together, of course, with the subsidiary 
legislation made pursuant to these two main, or parent, laws). 
The latter law was promulgated a hundred years ago - in 1901. 
This law, as the title implies, was never intended to be a 
weapon in the arsenal for the fight against drug abuse; in 1901 
research on drug addiction by the medical profession was 
still in its infancy. Only years before (in the 1890s), the Ger­
man scientist Heinrich Dreser had commercialized diacetyl­
morphine (today known as diamorphine) and called it 'heroin': 
it was really a trademark to mean powerful or heroic. Its use 
was advocated as a non-addictive treatment for coughs and 
chest and lung ailments; and the Bayer company advertised 
heroin in the same way as it did aspirin and other products 
until the addictive properties of heroin became apparent. The 
Medical and Kindred Professions Ordinance was originally 
intended only to organize or regulate the medical profession 
in Malta, as well as professions such as those of veterinary 
surgeon, apothecary, midwife, dentist and so on. This law got 
dragged into the fight against drug abuse simply because some 
of its provisions, quite incidentally, happened to deal with the 
sale and prescription of certain drugs. In fact it was quite late 
in the day - in the mid-1980s - with the Drugs Control Reg­
ulations of 1985, made pursuant to this Medical and Kindred 
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Professions Ordinance, that this law was finally utilized to 
full effect to try and stem the abuse with the so-called psycho­
tropic drugs, these being in turn subdivided into restricted and 
specified drugs. It was also in 1985 that some of the provi­
sions of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, such as the pro­
vision distinguishing between prosecution before the Mag­
istrates' Court and prosecution before the Criminal Court, 
began to be translated into the Medical and Kindred Profes­
sions Ordinance. The result is that to-day we have two sep­
arate laws, in many respects with identical provisions (some 
of which are applied merely by way of cross reference), one 
of which deals with such drugs as cannabis, heroin and co­
caine and the other with drugs such as - to mention the most 
popular- 'ecstasy' (MDMA) and 'angel dust' (phencyclidine). 
Over the years the various amendments to the Medical and 
Kindred Professions Ordinance in that part dealing with drug 
abuse and the fight against drug trafficking - with its 'freez­
ing orders', 'investigation orders' and 'attachment orders' -
have made this law more complicated than the Dangerous 
Drugs Ordinance. Perhaps it is time that these two laws be con­
solidated into one, at least as far as drug abuse is concerned, 
which would do away with unnecessary repetition and cross 
references. Allow me, however, to concentrate on the Dan­
gerous Drugs Ordinance which is still regarded, and per­
haps rightly so, as the main law in connection with the fight 
against drug abuse. 
This law was enacted just before the outbreak of the Sec­
ond World War, in 1939, and was intended in large measure 
to give effect to three international conventions which by that 
time had been signed by the imperial government, namely 
the Hague Convention of 1912, and the First and Second 
Geneva Conventions which had been signed on behalf of 
His Majesty's Government in February 1925 and in July 1931 
respectively. For over thirty years this law remained un­
changed. No only that, but it was a law with which most 
lawyers, including criminal lawyers, were totally unfamiliar. 
When I was a law student at the University here in Malta -
and I assure you that that was not in the days of the Boer 
War but between 1970 and 197 5 - none of our lecturers ever 
even mentioned this law. The reason was, of course, that till 
that time drug taking or drug abuse was not, or was not per­
ceived as, a social problem. As a student, my perception of 
illicit drug taking was the smoking of marijuana by Ameri­
can Gls in Vietnam, about which one occasionally heard on 
the radio and on television. To be honest, I did not even know 
that marijuana was cannabis, and if anyone asked me what 
'qanneb' was, I would immediately refer him to that stuff 
which the plumber used to seal the joints of water pipes! 
As I am sure most of you know, one of the unusual fea­
tures of our drugs legislation is the discretion enjoyed by the 
Attorney General in deciding whether a person is to be tried 
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before the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Ju­
dicature or before the Criminal Court. Depending on this de­
cision, a person may, for the same offence - for example, 
trafficking in cannabis - be liable either to life imprisonment 
(if he is tried before the Criminal Court) or to a maximum 
of ten years imprisonment (if he is tried before the Inferior 
Court). This feature is to-day found in both the Dangerous 
Drugs Ordinance and in the Medical and Kindred Professions 
Ordinance, but owes its origin to the former law. Let me make 
it quite clear from the outset that our Constitutional Court 
some years ago (in 1990) ruled that the existence of this dis­
cretion did not per se violate the provisions of the Constitu­
tion or of the European Convention on Human Rights guar­
anteeing the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom from 
discrimination. Even before the first amendment to the Dan­
gerous Drugs Ordinance was effected in 1975, the possibil­
ity of trying an individual for the same offence either before 
the Criminal Court or before the Court of Magistrates existed, 
but the wording of the relevant provision (it was then sub­
section (3) of Section 22) was such that it was quite clear that 
the rule was that a person was to be tried before the Magis­
trates' Court; only if the Governor certified that it was desir­
able that that person be tried before the Criminal Court ( and 
therefore liable to the higher punishment) was he to be so tried 
before that Superior Court. Recourse to the Governor (later 
the Governor General and the President) was in itself an ex­
ceptional measure, and therefore one was justified in arguing 
that only in exceptional circumstances was a person to be tried 
before the Criminal Court. And, indeed, the Constitutional 
Court, in the 1990 judgement I have just mentioned, stated that 
this discretion is in the nature of a quasi-judicial discretion, 
and that implicit in this discretion is the understanding that the 
Attorney General is to bring the more serious cases before the 
Criminal Court and the less serious ones before the Magis­
trates' Court. Of course, the gravity of any given offence must 
be assessed taking into consideration all the circumstances of 
the case; the gravity of a case cannot be assessed simply by 
looking at the quantity or the nature of the drug involved, al­
though undoubtedly the quantity and, to a lesser extent, the 
nature, are prime considerations. What the Constitutional Court 
seems to be saying is that it would not be correct for the At­
torney General to send a person to be tried by the Criminal 
Court and, for the same or identical facts to send another per­
son to be tried before the Inferior Court. 
The first amendment in 1975 merely introduced a distinc­
tion, as far as trial before the Magistrates' Court was con­
cerned, between a first conviction and a second or subsequent 
conviction, making, of course the latter liable to a higher pun­
ishment. No distinction was, at this stage, made between what 
I would call the 'simple addict' -that is the person who is in 
possession of a drug for his own personal use -and the drug 
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trafficker. The first and substantial change in the law came 
in 1980. Act XXIII of that year did a number of things. First 
of all it increased substantially the list of drugs to which the 
Ordinance applied -these were added in the form of a sched­
ule -the First Schedule-to the Ordinance. Secondly, the pun­
ishment in the case of trial before the Criminal Court was in­
creased from a maximum of ten years to a maximum of twen­
ty years (in 1980 twenty five years was the maximum deter­
minate sentence of imprisonment that was possible under the 
Criminal Code). Thirdly, the discretion which had hitherto 
been exercised by the Head of State as to the choice of court 
was transferred to the Attorney General. Finally in 1980 we 
also have the first attempt to distinguish between the 'simple 
addict' and the 'trafficker': in fact, although the law provided 
that the Attorney General was now to direct whether a person 
was to be tried before the Superior Court or the Inferior Court 
- with the consequent difference in the punishment to which
he was liable -the law also provided that, and I quote:
... where the Attorney General or the Court, as the case may 
be, is satisfied that the offender is not a person who cultivates, 
produces, sells, or otherwise deals in any drug, and the of­
fence consists only in the possession of a dangerous drug for 
the exclusive use of the offender, or of utensils for that pur­
pose, or consists in the taking of any such drug (i) any such 
person shall not be tried before the Criminal Court and shall 
not be liable to imprisonment and (ii) where any such person 
as aforesaid is, on the date on which the offence is discov­
ered, registered as a person who is under treatment for ad­
diction to drugs, in such manner and in accordance with such 
arrangements as may have been made by the Minister re­
sponsible for health, and, is certified under those arrange­
ments to be following the treatment prescribed to him, such 
person shall be exempt from any punishment in respect of 
any of the said offences committed while he was registered 
as aforesaid. 
Moreover this same amending act, in subsection (8) of Sec­
tion 22, provided that: 
Where it results to the Court, that the offender, not being a 
person who cultivates, produces, sells or otherwise deals in 
any drug, is in need of medical care and assistance for his re­
habilitation, the court may, instead of applying any of the 
punishments provided for in the foregoing subsections, order 
that the offender be remitted to an institution designated for the 
purpose by the Minister responsible for health in order that he 
may be given the necessary treatment. The Court shall cause 
such order to be forthwith conveyed to the Minister responsi­
ble for health, who will give such directives as he may deem 
fit for the care and treatment of any such person. 
Here we have the first indirect admission and recognition by 
the legislature that the drugs problem, at least in the form rep­
resented by the 'simple addict', is in reality not a criminal 
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justice issue or problem, but a public health issue. The 'sim­
ple addict' was not to be tried before the Criminal Court but 
only before the Magistrates' Court; he was not liable to im­
prisonment but only to pecuniary punishments; if he was a 
registered addict and following treatment, he was not to be 
subjected to any punishment; and, in any case, if he was in 
need of medical care and assistance for his rehabilitation, the 
court could, instead of fining him, commit him to an insti­
tution designated by the Minister of Health for the purpose, 
and the Minister of Health would in effect take over by giv­
ing the necessary directives as he thought fit for the care and 
treatment of such person. 
This amendment sounded like a perfect solution. In fact 
it had two fundamental flaws. The first flaw is that 'public 
health issues' and 'criminal justice issues' do not quite mix 
with the same ease of gin and tonic - in fact I would say that 
they do not mix at all. The primary role of the criminal jus­
tice system is not to rehabilitate or cure or provide treatment: 
neither its procedures nor its methods are intended or suited 
for that purpose. The primary role of the criminal justice sys­
tem, with its more or less rigid,judgmental attitudes based on 
concepts or morality, of what is right and of what is wrong, 
is to protect society by repressing, with its array of punish­
ments, behaviour which is regarded as dangerous to that so­
ciety. To deter and to put away if necessary remain, in spite of 
all that is said and written about the rehabilitation of offend­
ers, the primary response of the criminal justice system. 'Pub­
lic health', on the other hand, is not concerned with assigning 
guilt or with punishing, but with the prevention of the spread 
of disease. If the 'simple addict' was a public health issue, he 
should under no circumstance have been arraigned before the 
courts of criminal justice, and the matter should have been 
taken in hand straight away by the Minister of Health without 
the courts of criminal justice having to intervene. After all 
it sounds, and I would venture to say it is, inhumane to pun­
ish someone simply because he is sick - and health issues 
imply sickness . Moreover I am sure that those of you who 
are members of the medical profession will agree with me 
when I say that lawyers, including judges and magistrates, 
are among the least competent persons to deal with public 
health issues (a lawyer and a doctor in court, especially when 
the latter is being savaged in the course of examination or cross 
examination, are like the proverbial diavolo and acqua santa!) 
But there was another, more practical problem, to the solu­
tion proposed in 1980. The line of demarcation between the 
'simple addict' and the person who deals in drugs is a very 
fine one indeed, and very often the one figure merges into the 
other. We have all come across the person who, in order to 
support his addiction, resorts to peddling the drug himself, 
or the drug addict who 'shares' his wares with others who are 
similarly inclined or equally addicted. And that, as we know, 
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amounts to 'trafficking'. The law did not make, and still does 
not make, and possibly cannot make, a clear-cut distinction 
between the trafficker who is primarily an addict and the traf­
ficker whose addiction is only secondary to trafficking. I will, 
however, later on argue that it may be possible to isolate for 
practical purposes the 'simple addict'. 
But allow me to return to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. 
The next major amendment to this law came in 1986. This 
amendment was intended to hit hard the 'trafficker', includ­
ing, of course, the trafficker who was a drug addict. The crime 
of' conspiracy for the purpose of selling or dealing in a drug' 
was introduced; the law also extended its extra-territorial arm 
and made it a criminal offence for any citizen of Malta or per­
manent resident of Malta to do any act outside Malta which, 
if committed in Malta, would amount to the offence of sell­
ing or dealing in a drug or to the offence of conspiracy for 
the purpose of selling or dealing in such drug. As for punish­
ment, the law began to distinguish between trafficking and 
conspiracy to traffic on the one hand, and most other offences 
on the other hand, the former being, of course punished more 
severely by raising the minimum punishment which could be 
applied. The 1986 amendment did not alter the legal situation 
as far as the 'simple addict' was concerned: he was still not to 
be tried before the Criminal Court and was not liable to im­
prisonment; if he was a registered addict and receiving treat­
ment he was not liable to punishment at all; and if the court 
was satisfied that he needed 'care and assistance for his re­
habilitation', it could, as I have already said, instead of impos­
ing a pecuniary punishment, send him off to be cared for by 
the Minister of Health in an institution designated for the pur­
pose. To be quite honest, I do not recall from my days in the 
Attorney General's Office whether any institution was ever 
designated for the purposes of subsection (8) of Section 22. 
One other feature of the 1986 amendments was the provision 
for a diminution of punishment in the case of a person who has 
helped the police to apprehend the person or persons who 
supplied him with the drugs. While one can understand the 
raison d'etre of this provision,one cannot help feel, in a num­
ber of cases that come before the courts, that the accused or 
the person being interrogated by the police will readily men­
tion anyone as the supplier of the drug in the hope of obtain­
ing a reduction of punishment. It is true that the law requires 
that the accused should have actually helped the police to ap­
prehend the supplier, and not merely indicated any person 
who, perhaps, cannot even be traced by the police; it is also 
true that the courts have generally interpreted the expression 
'apprehended by the Police' to mean that the police or, as the 
case may be, the court is reasonably convinced on a balance 
of probabilities that the person indicated as the supplier and 
who has been arrested by the police is in fact the supplier; 
this provision is, in any case, one that has to be applied with 
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the greatest caution and circumspection by the police and 
by the courts - miscarriages of justice in Italy due to the so­
called 'pentiti' are all too familiar to us. 
The year 1994 marks an important turning point. Act VI 
of that year, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 
did away completely with the idea that the 'simple addict' 
was not liable to imprisonment. Henceforth, even the 'sim­
ple addict' could be imprisoned from a minimum of twelve 
months to a maximum of ten years if tried and convicted be­
fore the Criminal Court or from a minimum of three months 
to a maximum of twelve months if tried and convicted before 
the Magistrates' Court. The law no longer stipulated, as it had 
done until then, that the 'simple addict' was not to be tried be­
fore the Criminal Court - though it must be said, and this is 
a credit to the way the Attorney General has managed the law 
up to now, that I know of no case where a 'simple addict' was 
ever tried before the criminal court except in cases where the 
charge of possession was brought together with charges of 
other crimes (for example, theft, fraud, living on the earnings 
of prostitution and so on) which fall to be tried by the said 
Criminal Court. The 1994 amendments, however, provided 
that in the case of the 'simple addict', if the court was of the 
view that the person convicted was 'in need of care and as­
sistance for his rehabilitation from dependence on any dan­
gerous drug' the court could (notice the optional nature of 
the provision) instead of applying any of the punishments 
prescribed, place him on probation under the provisions of 
the Probation of Offenders Act. With regard to the 'traffick­
er' (irrespective of whether or not he is also an addict) the 
1994 amendments expressly ruled out (in subsection (9) of 
Section 22) the possibility of either a Probation Order or a 
suspended sentence of imprisonment. However, recognizing 
that also the 'trafficker' may be 'in need of treatment for his 
rehabilitation form dependence' on a dangerous drug, the leg­
islator, in subsections (10) to (14), introduced a complicated 
procedure whereby a so-called 'order for treatment' can be 
made. To date, I have not seen one such order, and although 
I have not had the time to research the matter properly, I 
very much suspect that no such 'treatment order' has in fact 
ever been made by any of the courts of criminal justice. Ba­
sically, the treatment order which may be made with regard 
to a 'trafficker' involves 
1. the written certification by the Minister responsible for
public health that such treatment may be given in prison,
2. the person convicted agrees to submit to such treatment,
3. the punishment of imprisonment is reduced by one third
and
4. the order must also specify the 'treatment period'.
If the court which made such order is satisfied, upon an ap­
plication by the Attorney General, that the person in question 
has, without valid reason, either refused the treatment, or has 
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conducted himself in a manner as to make his treatment, or 
that of other prisoners, difficult or ineffective, the court will 
revoke the 'treatment order' and the prisoner looses the ben­
efit of the one third reduction in his prison sentence (that is 
the original period of imprisonment will have to be served). 
The order may even be revoked at the request of the pris­
oner himself, in which case also the original period of im­
prisonment will have to be served. 
Finally, in 1996, in a move clearly designed to send the 
necessary signals to drug traffickers, Parliament increased the 
maximum punishment which can be awarded by the Crim­
inal Court to life imprisonment. Life imprisonment is ap­
plicable, among other situations, to the following: 
1. those who cultivate the opium poppy (the Papver som­
niferum) or the coca plant (Erythloxylum coca),
2. those who cultivate the plant cannabis,
3. those who sell or deal in a drug contrary to the provisions
of the Ordinance,
4. those who conspire for the purpose of selling or dealing,
and
5. those found in possession of a drug under such circum­
stances that that the Court is satisfied that such posses­
sion was not for the exclusive use of the person in whose
possession that drug is found.
All these are liable to the punishment of life imprisonment if 
tried before the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court, howev­
er, is authorized (that is may not apply, not must not apply) not 
to apply the punishment of life imprisonment and to apply in­
stead the punishment of imprisonment from a minimum of 
four years to a maximum of thirty years in either of these two 
circumstances: 
1. if it is of the opinion, taking into account the age of the
offender, his previous conduct, and the quantity of the
drug concerned, that the punishment of imprisonment
for life would not be appropriate, or (the second circum­
stance)
ii. if the verdict of the jury is not unanimous.
This second circumstance was clearly intended to mirror a pro­
vision in the Criminal Code which provides that in the case 
of those offences which, as a rule, carry the mandatory sen­
tence of imprisonment for life (for example, wilful homicide, 
arson endangering life, or if you set fire to a vessel of war, a 
public dock or an artillery park) a determinate sentence of im­
prisonment may instead be awarded by the court if the jury is 
not unanimous in its verdict of guilt (in other words if they re­
turn a majority verdict). The first exception ( or circumstance) 
to the life imprisonment rule for 'traffickers' was clearly dic­
tated by the wide definition of the word 'trafficking' or, to be 
more precise, the word 'dealing' (we generally use the word 
'trafficking' because the Maltese rendering of the word 'deal­
ing' is 'jitraffika'). By an express provision in the Dangerous 
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Drugs Ordinance, the word 'dealing' with reference to deal­
ing in a drug, includes cultivation of that drug, its importa­
tion into Malta in such circumstances that the court is satis­
fied that such importation was not for the exclusive use of 
the offender, the manufacture of a drug, its exportation, distri­
bution, production, administration, supply, the offer to do any 
of these acts (for example, the offer to supply) and - some­
thing which is not very widely known - even the giving of 
information intended to lead to the purchase of such a drug 
contrary to the provisions of the Ordinance amounts to 'deal­
ing' or 'trafficking'. Let us take this hypothetical scenario: a 
person - we shall call him John- is a drug addict and, let us 
say, has been addicted to heroin for a number of years. He has 
never shared his heroin with anyone, never sold it, and always 
had in his possession just enough to satisfy his personal needs 
for that day and for the immediate future. One fine day, how­
ever, he tells another person from where he is buying the hero­
in because that other person wants to buy the stuff himself, 
and clearly intending that that other person should avail him­
self of the same source of the drug. If John is tried before the 
Criminal Court - let us say because the charge of trafficking 
is brought together with a charge of theft - John is liable to a 
punishment from a minimum of four years to a maximum of 
life imprisonment- although one would assume in such a case 
that the Court will apply the exception and award not life but 
a determinate prison sentence. The court cannot put John on 
probation; nor can it award a suspended sentence of impris­
onment; nor can it go below the minimum of four years un­
less it can be ascertained that John has in fact helped the po­
lice to apprehend the person who was supplying him with the 
drug- who could well be another addict! Moreover the Crim­
inal Court must also impose a fine ranging from a minimum 
of one thousand Malta Liri to a maximum of fifty thousand 
Malta Liri. Now, what is clear is that what John is most in need 
of is to help him to part with his drug habit. But faced with 
such a charge, and aware of the punishment which he could 
be awarded, even if in its minimum, he is unlikely to plead 
guilty at the start of committal proceedings. The compilation 
of evidence commences, and it may be months before the 
Attorney General files the Bill of Indictment in the Criminal 
Court. By the time this indictment has been filed, John is un­
dergoing a rehabilitation programme. The question is often 
asked - did John have to wait until he was caught and arraigned 
in court to commence such a programme? Is this not just a 
defence ploy to try and get the court to be as lenient as pos­
sible at the sentencing stage? It is here that a judge or mag­
istrate must exercise considerable caution. Undoubtedly there 
will be cases where the programme is undertaken for improp­
er motives; but one must not forget that very often in a per­
son's life, especially a person whose life is dominated by some 
form of addiction - be it to drugs, alcohol, cigarettes or gam-
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bling - it takes a dramatic tum of events to get that person 
to change into a different gear and to really start doing some­
thing about the problem. From my own experience as a judge, 
I can tell you that nothing gives me more satisfaction than to 
see someone whose life was in shambles picking up those 
pieces with the help of others and putting some order into 
his life - and I must here pay tribute to the professionalism 
and dedication of our probation officers without whose help 
a judge or magistrate is, in some cases, lost when he comes 
to the sentencing stage in cases similar to John's. 
To get back to our John, by the time his case comes up for 
trial before the Criminal Court, he has successfully complet­
ed the rehabilitation programme; he is, perhaps for the first time 
in his life, gainfully employed: yet the nature of the drugs 
charge makes it mandatory for the Criminal Court to impose 
at least a four year prison sentence and a minimum fine of a 
thousand Malta Liri ( convertible into another three months 
imprisonment if not paid according to law). Even if John were 
to be tried before the Magistrates Court, he would have to be 
sentenced at least to the mandatory six months imprisonment 
and a fine of not less than two hundred Malta Liri. I have cho­
sen an extreme example precisely to illustrate the core prob­
lem in the application of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. More 
or less the same could be said to arise as far as the Medical 
and Kindred Professions Ordinance is concerned. The core 
problem is: how is the court to deal with the addict? Should 
the addict be a problem with which the criminal justice sys­
tem is concerned? 
Persons who are charged under the Dangerous Drugs Or­
dinance could be classified, broadly speaking, into five cat­
egories: 
There is first of all what I have chosen to call earlier on 
the 'simple addict'. He is the person who is dependent of 
drugs, buys drugs for his own personal use and never has more 
in his possession than he actually needs for that day or the 
immediate future. He does not 'share' the drug with others nor 
peddles it in any way. Should the 'simple addict' be the con­
cern of the criminal justice system, or should he be dealt with 
as a public health issue? On this particular point Avram Gold­
stein, Professor Emeritus of Pharmacology at Stanford Uni­
versity in the United States, makes the following suggestion 
in his book Addiction: From Biology to Drug Policy: 'Drugs 
policies,' he says, 'have too often been driven by public panic 
and media hysteria, to which politicians respond by whatever 
actions they think will be reassuring in the immediate crisis. 
This pattern does not address the real need. It is time to return 
the drug problem to the domain of medicine and public health, 
where it belongs. For many reasons it is logical to approach 
drug addiction as if it were an infectious disease. Such con­
cepts as incidence, prevalence, relative immunity and genetic 
and environmental influences on susceptibility can be applied 
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to both. Attempts at prevention, eradication, education, treat­
ment, relapse prevention and containment are comparable. 
And important for preventing the spread of drug addiction is 
the fact that -as with infectious diseases - it is primarily the 
newly infected who transmit the condition to their peers. Quar­
antine, which has sometimes been used in severe and life­
threatening epidemics, can be an effective tool... but it al­
ways raises ethical and legal issues concerning the degree to 
which it is permissible to restrict the personal liberties of those 
who are infected in order to protect those who are not' (p. 308). 
What I ask you to consider, ladies and gentlemen, is whether 
the 'simple addict' should remain the concern of the criminal 
justice system, or whether he should be dealt with by the pub­
lic health authorities in the same way that they deal with in­
fectious diseases and without reference to the courts of crim­
inal justice. Of course, when referring to the 'simple addict' 
as the person who may be in possession of a drug for that 
day's need and for his immediate future, the question invari­
ably arises: but of how much drug are we talking in terms of 
quantity? This is one of the most difficult questions that judges 
and magistrates have to address in connection with the offence 
of possession of a drug in such circumstances which indicate 
that that drug was not for the exclusive use of the possessor. 
Possession in such circumstances is equated under our law 
with trafficking as far as punishment is concerned, whether the 
person is tried before the Criminal Court or the Inferior Court. 
The same problem is encountered by English courts with the 
analogous offence of possession with intent to supply under 
Section 5(3) of the (English) Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971. How 
much is a person's requirement for a day or two days is always 
something very difficult to gauge; in practice I have found that 
even experts, whether analysts or medical doctors, are often 
unwilling-or, perhaps, in reality, unable-to give evidence of 
a person's daily requirement of a drug because of the variables 
of tolerance and dependence. If, however, the 'simple addict' 
is to be siphoned off from the criminal justice system, it would 
be necessary for the legislator to determine the minimum 
amount of each drug that would indicate possession for one's 
exclusive use. 
The second category is the addict who traffics to maintain 
his habit. He clearly poses a threat to society, and one can le­
gitimately argue that the criminal justice system should con­
tinue to deter his behaviour by its system of punishments. In 
the case of this person, however, I believe it is important to en­
sure that once the courts have passed judgement and awarded 
punishment it should be able for him, either contemporane­
ously with or after the expiration of the punishment, to under­
take the necessary rehabilitation programme. This means that 
the criminal justice system should not, of itself, be an obstacle 
to such a programme and to the possibility that he be reinte­
grated into society. It is highly desirable in the case of people 
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falling into this category that their case be dealt with by the 
criminal justice system as expeditiously as possible - per­
haps a 'fast track' system could be devised for these persons, 
at least before the Magistrates' Court. A person in this cate­
gory should also be arraigned in Court as quickly as possi­
ble after he is caught, and not months or years after (though, 
as a former prosecutor, I appreciate that there could be prob­
lems with the staggering of cases, so that those whose case 
has been decided can give evidence in someone else's case) 
The system should also ensure that if the person has several 
cases of the same kind pending, these should be joined into 
one case so that he can benefit from the rules governing con­
currence of punishments; this would also ensure that after the 
person has served time, he will not, instead of picking up his 
life, have to face further court proceedings. Moreover, in the 
case of persons in this category, there should be minimal use 
of fines. According to law, a fine has to be paid upon comple­
tion of the more severe type of punishment, that is after serv­
ing the period of imprisonment. If, after serving a term of im­
prisonment, with possibly some progress by way of reha­
bilitation having been made, the person concerned is faced 
with a substantial fine which he either cannot pay and there­
fore has to serve time in lieu, or which will push him into fi­
nancial debt, it may well be that further progress with his 
rehabilitation will be impossible. 
The third and fourth categories comprise the trafficker who 
happens to be an addict, and the trafficker who is not an addict. 
These persons present a law enforcement problem: they are 
generally the 'big fish' who are not easily caught. Unfortunate­
ly it is quite tempting for the police to go after persons in cat­
egories one and two to inflate police statistics; to apprehend 
persons in categories three and four usually requires long term 
planning, surveillance, the use of precious resources. It is for 
persons in these two categories that that the legislator has 
generally kept increasing punishments up to the present life 
imprisonment. 
Finally there are those who 'experiment' with drugs with­
out being either addicts or traffickers. This seems to be partic­
ularly the case with young people using designer drugs such 
as ecstasy. Some people argue that youngsters experimenting 
with drugs need only a firm slap on the wrist and not crimi­
nal sanctions or treatment. I beg to differ. Here we are deal­
ing with a drug (I am referring to ecstasy) which, as most of 
you know, is particularly dangerous because it gives the ap­
pearance of being innocuous - possibly because it does not 
lead to physical dependence - when in reality it is extremely 
dangerous because of its unpredictability and the damage it 
causes to certain brain neurons even in minor doses. If social 
constraints and the education system have failed to keep young­
sters away from this type of drug taking, the short, sharp, 
shock 'treatment' of moderate fining and/or short terms of 
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imprisonment could perhaps bring some of these youngsters 
to their senses. I was particularly disturbed earlier this year 
when presiding over a trail by jury of a person who was 
charged, among other things, with the involuntary homicide 
of his friend after he had supplied him with just one ecstasy 
pill. What disturbed me was not so much the death itself, as the 
ease, the nonchalant way, with which the various witnesses, 
who were friends both of the victim and of the accused, took 
this drug much in the same way as you or I would consume 
things like Rowntree's Fruit Pastilles! Clearly something is 
wrong in the State of Denmark if so many of our youngsters 
are prepared to play Russian roulette! 
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Of course, drug related crime includes not only drug tak­
ing and drug-pushing; in Malta over the years we have also 
seen a considerable amount of crimes against property, large­
ly petty thieving, to finance drug taking. Persons charged with 
these crimes, who also happen to be addicts and where the 
crime is somehow related to the addiction, should be treated 
in the same way as those addicts falling into category two. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I would have liked to say much 
more - never let it be said that a lawyer is at a loss for words 
- but I am sure I have said enough. I hope I have given you
a little bit of food for thought. If I have not, I apologize for
wasting your time. Thank you.
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